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The application of mean-variance portfolio models to the reserve 
management of central banks reveals that authorities do not 
optimally diversify their foreign-exchange portfolio. The paper 
suggests that the underdiversification into DM assets is largely 
due to the resistance of the Bundesbank to promote the DM's inter­
national role motivated by the fear to loose control over monetary 
policy. The paper then presents a model on reserve diversification 
based on the view that diversification away from dollar holdings 
was mainly caused by the removal of the convertibility constraint 
on official dollar balances. The analysis suggests that this con­
straint was reestablished by the evolution of the Deutschmark as a 
second main reserve currency - attributing the dominant role of 
the dollar to the size of the U.S. economy and its capital market 
and the increasing role of the Deutschmark to the Bundesbank's 
reputation to provide a predictable and low-inflationary currency 
- and that reserve diversification can therefore be regarded as a 
stabilizing element in the international monetary system.
This research was undertaken as part of the author's Ph.D. disser­
tation at the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence and 
was supported by the DAAD and the EUI. I would like to especially 
thank Emil Claassen and Wolfgang Gebauer for their valuable 
criticisms and encouragement. I am also grateful to Jean-Claude 
Chouraqui, Pierre Dehez, Wolfgang Rieke, Alexander Swoboda, Niels 























































































































































































The composition of foreign-exchange reserves of central banks 
has undergone substantial changes over the last few years. Since 
the end of the Bretton Woods era during which the U.S. dollar 
accounted for 80-90 percent of official currency holdings a con­
siderable degree of diversification out of dollar holdings can be 
observed for two periods. One was the diversification carried out 
between 1978 and 1980. This period was characterized by a decline 
in absolute total dollar holdings and a depreciation of the dollar 
exchange rate. The other was the large-scale diversification bet­
ween the early 1980s and 1985. This diversification coincided with 
the sharp appreciation of the dollar exchange rate. Especially in 
1978 and 1979, the counterpart of reserve switches out of the 
dollar was a substantial increase of Deutschmark holdings. The 
complementary development between DM and dollar holdings can also 
be observed for the 1980s although it appears to have been less 
pronounced.^
The major part of existing studies on the composition of 
foreign-exchange holdings of central banks builds on the mean- 
variance portfolio approach stressing the influence of risk and 
return associated with reserve holdings denominated in different 
currencies. An earlier study used an alternative strategy. Heller 
and Knight (1978) build on the inventory approach stressing that 
reserves are generally used to finance deficits and accumulated 
from surpluses in international transactions. The use of reserves 
for deficit financing reflects the basic role of reserves, i.e. to 
defend the exchange rate of a currency through intervention on 
foreign-exchange markets if the external payments position of the 
issuing country is in deficit. Very recently, Dooley, Lizondo and 
Mathieson (1989) attempted to link the two approaches by including
1. The described development reflects diversification of aggre­
gate reserve portfolios 'net' of distributional effects which 
include changes in the currency composition of reserve hold­
ings of US authorities and the below-average growth of re­
serve holdings of Germany assuming that the entire foreign- 
exchange portfolio of these two countries are denominated in 




























































































the use of a specific reserve currency in international trans­
actions in a mean-variance portfolio model. However, the basic 
structure of their empirical analysis is identical to the one used 
by Heller and Knight (1978).
The two approaches come to different conclusions. The inven­
tory approach suggests to highly concentrate official foreign- 
exchange holdings in U.S. dollars due to the presence of economies 
of scale involved in asset-exchange costs if all indirect inter­
national transactions are done in one single ('vehicle') currency. 
With this approach, a certain degree of diversification away from 
dollar holdings may be explained by a decline in the use of the OS 
dollar in transactions among the major countries of the world 
economy in the last few years due to a reduction of transactions 
costs on dollar versus major non-dollar currencies.
The studies applying international portfolio selection theory 
to the management of foreign-exchange holdings of central banks 
[Kouri and de Macedo (1978), de Macedo (1982), Ben-Bassat (1984), 
Horii (1986)] suggest that - in particular for industrial coun­
tries - the dollar should be playing a substantially smaller role 
than is in fact the case whereas the Deutschmark is under-repre­
sented in the actual portfolio mix.
One major reason for the gap between optimal and actual port­
folio compositions may be that central banks manage only parts of 
their foreign-exchange holdings in accordance with portfolio 
selection models. Other possible criteria may include the mutual 
currency agreements in the European Monetary System (and previous­
ly in the Snake) to limit holdings of member currencies to working 
balances and considerations of international monetary stability.
Since central banks seem to have committed themselves to 
stable exchange rates even after the adoption of widespread float­
ing reserve diversification would only be unconstrained under the 
assumption that central banks' transactions on exchange markets 
have no price effects, i.e. are not an independent source of 
exchange-rate instability. This assumption holds, however, only if 




























































































small and if a number of currencies offer a sufficiently wide 
range of investment possibilities and a broad asset market.
This means that reserve diversification is subject to two con­
straints. Markets of only few currencies have a degree of finan­
cial intermediation sufficiently high in order to avoid being 
disturbed by a given volume of transactions. This was reflected in 
the attitude of the Bundesbank to actively discourage use of the 
DM as a reserve asset for much of the period since 1973. In addi­
tion, the degree of reserve diversification of individual central 
banks seems to be partly a function of the level of reserves mean­
ing that the lower the proportion of reserves held by a country 
for transactions purposes, i.e. the larger its 'idle' balances, 
the larger is the impact on exchange rates of its potential cur­
rency conversions. Accordingly, the gap between optimal and actual 
reserve portfolios present for a number of industrial countries 
with large foreign-exchange holdings may be caused by considera­
tions of international monetary stability. The author [Mayer 
(1989)] has shown elsewhere that industrial countries in fact tend 
to change their reserve composition only in periods when this 
policy is in accordance with exchange rate stabilization.
The second major cause for the gap between actual and optimal 
reserve portfolios may be seen in the institutional problems of 
any international monetary system, i.e. questions associated with 
the adjustment problem and the confidence problem. This will be 
the focus of this paper.
The scope of the following analysis is to trace the reasons 
for the gap between actual reserve portfolios of central banks and 
the portfolios calculated by the various studies on this issue by 
studying the impact of the presence of a number of reserve curren­
cies on the conduct of monetary policy by reserve-currency coun­
tries. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 focuses 
on the reasons that make international monetary system tend to 
evolve asymmetrically and that make one specific currency attain a 
special role in the system. Section 3 emphasizes the importance of 
the presence of a convertibility constraint on a reserve currency 




























































































monetary system with more than one main reserve currency. The 
conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2. Adjustment and Confidence in an International Monetary System
The questions of adjustment and confidence are at the heart of 
any international monetary system as they determine the system's 
degree of symmetry and thus the degree of independence of each 
individual member country's monetary policy.
Adjustment refers to "... the process by which deficits and 
surpluses [in the payments positions of individual countries] are 
eliminated" [Machlup and Malkiel (1964, p. 25)]. In the Bretton 
Woods system, the United States were able to finance their pay­
ments deficits through the increase of dollar-denominated liabili­
ties due to the dollar's role as a reserve currency. The authori­
ties of other countries had to acquire these liabilities in order 
to avoid an appreciation of their currencies, thus depriving them­
selves of any control over domestic monetary policy. Deficits by 
non-reserve-currency countries, by contrast, had to be balanced by 
a transfer of assets. This means that the burden of adjustment was 
asymmetrically allocated to the countries other than the United 
States. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system did not substan­
tially change this principle although - in addition to the United 
States - the new reserve-currency countries have been enabled to 
settle payments deficits by issuing liabilities denominated in 
their own currencies.
Confidence in reserve media refers to "... the need for avoid­
ing sudden switches between different reserve media" [Machlup and 
Malkiel (1964, p. 24)]. These switches are associated with depre­
ciation risk connected with currency holdings. Holders of foreign- 
exchange reserves are not exposed to depreciation risk in only two 
cases. One is the assured convertibility of the dominant reserve 
currency into a commodity at a fixed price. In history, this 
commodity has mainly been gold. The other case in which holders of 
foreign-exchange reserves are not exposed to depreciation risk is 




























































































commodity exists but exchange-rate changes in the system - be it a 
fixed exchange-rate system or managed floating - can typically be 
expected as depreciations of non-reserve currencies relative to 
the reserve currency. This means that the reserve currency of the 
system would be that currency which is least likely to depreciate 
or - assuming purchasing power parity to hold - that has the low­
est average inflation rate of the system.
The issues of adjustment and confidence are closely related to 
the (n-1) problem. In a world economy with n currencies, there are 
only (n-1) independent exchange rates. Equally, in a world economy 
with n countries, only (n-1) countries need achieve balance-of- 
payments equilibrium. That is, one country is spared a balance-of- 
payments constraint, or in other words, it exerts benign neglect 
with respect to its balance of payments and hence to its exchange 
rate. On the other hand, the currency of the n-th country takes 
the role of the nominal anchor of the system. Accordingly, the n- 
th country uses the degree of freedom to pursue an independent 
and ideally low-inflationary - monetary policy which sets the path 
of inflation throughout the system.
Since historical examples show that monetary regimes have 
tended to asymmetry, i.e. that one currency has played a special 
role in the international monetary system (pound Sterling in the 
gold standard, the US dollar in the Bretton Woods system, and the 
Deutschmark in the EMS), the question arises as to the sources of 
asymmetry in monetary regimes. Three phenomena regarding the gene­
ration of asymmetry can be distinguished: diverging size of econ­
omies, diverging stability of currencies, and the form in which 
exchange rates are managed and reserves are held.
2.1 Asymmetry Caused by Diverging Size of Countries
The first explanation regarding differences in size is that 
the maintenance of world price stability requires dividing adjust­
ment to country-specific disturbances in inverse proportion to the 




























































































The second explanation is based on the evolution of interna­
tional financial intermediation. The world's principal interna­
tional financial intermediary has a considerable influence on 
conditions in money and credit markets worldwide. For one, a given 
rise in interest rates on the dominant capital market encourages 
international investors to transfer more capital into that market 
than the same rise in interest rates would lead them to transfer 
into a smaller capital market. Countries with evolved internation­
al financial intermediation can therefore balance current-account 
deficits relatively easily by capital flows. This is because 
breadth and depth of capital markets increase with an evolved 
system of international financial intermediation since investment 
in broad and deep markets is less risky than in thin ones. More­
over, resiliency of a capital market grows with its evolving role 
in international financial intermediation. This means that with a 
resilient capital market a country incurs lower costs associated 
with the role of a reserve center. The perceived loss of control 
over monetary policy, i.e. a reserve-currency country's fear of 
not always being able to sterilize the effects on domestic mone­
tary aggregates of variations in the external demand for its 
currency has tended to make 'new' reserve centers reluctant to 
accept this special role for their currencies.
The underdiversification into DM assets may be explained with­
in this context. The supply of short-term Treasury bills - the 
form of investment central banks tend to prefer - is considerably 
higher on the US capital market than on the German. This appears 
to have been part of the Bundesbank's strategy to deliberately 
discourage use of the DM as a reserve asset. It was argued that a 
continuing reserve diversification into DM assets would either 
lead to an excessive appreciation of the DM or, if the Bundesbank 
executed non-sterilized interventions, would undermine monetary 
policy [Deutsche Bundesbank (1979)]. However, with the experience 
of substantial current-account deficits between 1979-1981 German 
authorities found it convenient to borrow abroad in their own 
currency and increased the supply of DM-denominated assets - a 
measure also taken to lessen the pressure on foreign exchange mar­
kets. Nonetheless, the Bundesbank kept on worrying about extending 




























































































the German money and capital markets [Rieke (1982) and Deutsche 
Bundesbank (1984)].
A third explanation comes from diverging extents to which 
currencies are used in international transactions. Global welfare 
increases if all international transactions are made in the same 
currency because the use of a specific currency as a vehicle for 
international transactions lowers transactions costs of interna­
tional exchange. This feature is accentuated by the fact that once 
a currency has obtained a comparative advantage in reducing trans­
actions costs, a self-perpetuating process tends to reinforce the 
vehicle role of that currency [Jones (1976) and Chrystal (1984)].
2.2 Asymmetry Caused by Diverging Stability of Currencies
Asymmetry in monetary regimes may also occur when one currency 
is relatively more stable than other currencies. Starting from a 
situation in which the inflation rate in one country is higher 
than in another and the first country wants to disinflate, the 
central bank of the disinflating country may want to raise its 
credibility when it announces to adopt an austerity program. The 
credibility literature following Kydland and Prescott (1977) and 
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) has shown that the costs of disinfla­
tion are smaller when domestic residents believe that the program 
announced will actually be realized. The inflation-prone country 
can import the necessary credibility by linking its currency to a 
currency whose issuer has a higher reputation - be it by actually 
pegging the exchange rate or by a close management of the exchange 
rate with respect to the more stable currency. The disinflating 
country imports reputation by giving up independence of its mone­
tary policy - the system becomes asymmetric.
The core of this argument is that by pegging to a more stable 
currency the central bank manages to convince the other economic 
agents that it will carry through a disinflation. Whether these 
other agents are wage setters or holders of non-indexed government 
bonds, the crucial aspect is the inflationary impact of shifts in 




























































































relies on the credibility of the central bank's commitment to the 
exchange rate target. In a disinflationary strategy, exchange-rate 
pegging may be preferred to money growth targeting because of 
credibility problems of central banks, and because a reduction in
the rate of money growth raises real interest rates - and hence,
2induces a recession - if goods prices are sticky.
The adoption of an exchange-rate peg provides additional dis­
cipline to monetary authorities in inflation-prone countries 
because it forces the policymaker to accept a higher cost to 
expansionary policy through real appreciation. Assuming that 
realignments devalue the currency of the inflation-prone central 
bank by at most enough to restore purchasing-power parity (PPP), 
any monetary expansion causing inflation leads to a real apprecia­
tion - until the next realignment - which causes a loss in compe­
titiveness and hence tends to reduce output. Inflation is lower in 
such a monetary regime than in a regime with purely flexible 
exchange rates which maintains PPP throughout, disregarding the 
domestic inflation rate. On the other hand, if the currency to 
which the domestic currency is pegged is more inflationary, infla­
tion will be imported. Hence, monetary regimes whose objective is 
to disinflate tend to become asymmetrical by allocating the nomi­
nal anchor position to the least inflationary currency.
Pegging to a more stable currency has an important bearing on 
the choice of 'who intervenes'. If a currency is to serve as 
nominal anchor for the monetary system, its issuer must not 
intervene to stabilize cross rates if the cross rates are under 
pressure due to excessive monetary expansion by other members of 
the system. Non-sterilized intervention of the reserve-currency 
country would mean that it accepts the monetary expansion of its
2. Since a reduction in the rate of money growth decreases in­
flationary expectations and thus raises money demand, nominal 
interest rates need to increase to equilibrate the money 
market given the real stock of money and sticky prices. Due 
to the decrease in inflationary expectations the increase in 





























































































partner country, thereby compromizing its role as anchor of the 
system by a loss of reputation.
The question of 'who intervenes' is very important from anoth­
er angle as well. The ability of the United States to exploit its 
role as a reserve-currency country by raising seigniorage gains 
depends primarily on the stock of dollars in the portfolio of 
reserve holders. However, suppose that these holders are dissatis­
fied with the behavior of the US authorities, perhaps because of 
real value losses, and begin to shift into Deutschmark for exam­
ple. Then, the Bundesbank must take up the dollars that others 
want to shed if it wants to prevent the dollar from depreciating, 
thereby causing a depreciation of the Bundesbank's currency 
reserves. Hence, a flow of dollar reserves from one holder to 
another does not reduce the influence of US policies on the world 
economy. In general, even if the reserve-currency country does not 
issue the most stable currency any longer whether or not it mana­
ges to exploit its special role depends on its role in exchange- 
rate management.
2.3 Asymmetry caused by the Form of Exchange-Rate Management and
Reserve Holding
The third source of asymmetry involves two issues. The use of 
a currency for intervention in foreign-exchange markets tends to 
affect the domestic monetary aggregates of the country issuing the 
intervention currency. However, these effects can be sterilized 
either deliberately by compensating policy measures of domestic 
monetary authorities or automatically by the form in which inter­
vention is financed and reserves are held by foreign monetary 
authorities. A reserve-currency country may therefore be able to 
completely isolate its domestic monetary aggregates from influen­
ces of its currency's use in exchange-rate management and put the 
entire burden of adjustment on the other countries.
A result similar to Mundell's 'relative size criterion' is 
obtained by Swoboda (1978). He (p. 631) shows that - in the case 




























































































market purchases of securities increase the domestic money supply 
in proportion to the country's relative size." This is because an 
expansionary open-market operation in one country does not only 
raise its domestic money supply but also world money supply. How­
ever, the effect on world money supply is limited to the expan­
sionary country's relative size, i.e. the given change in the 
world money stock is distributed among the two countries in the 
fixed proportions of their relative economic sizes. The expansion­
ary country creates an excess supply of money and experiences a 
payments deficit and thus a reserve loss. This reserve loss raises 
the money supply in the non-expansionary country and decreases it 
in the expansionary country. The reserve loss approaches an amount 
equal to the initial money expansion as the relative size of the 
expansionary country becomes negligibly small.
Swoboda (1978) also shows that asymmetry can be introduced in 
a monetary regime by the way in which currency reserves are held. 
This argument is based on the fact that if the monetary authori­
ties in one country sterilizes the effects of the other country's 
monetary policy on its domestic money supply, the role of monetary 
policy in the other country is reduced to what it would be were 
the other country infinitisimally small.
In a two-country case (the United States and Europe) where all 
reserves are held in dollars, a US open-market operation changes 
the world money stock by more than an equal open-market operation 
in Europe. This is because reserve holdings of the European cen­
tral bank are a source of the high-powered base of European money 
supply whereas these reserve holdings are low-powered money in the 
other part of the system, i.e. deposits with US commercial banks. 
A US expansionary monetary policy leads to an outflow of reserves 
that diminishes the US money stock by less than it raises the 
European money stock.
Moreover, European holdings of dollar reserves with the US 
commercial banking system automatically sterilize reserve flows. 
The reason for this is that - assuming domestic assets held by the 
US central bank as given - dollar holdings with US commercial 




























































































banks for the backing of dollar balances held by US residents by 
the amount of dollar deposits of the European central bank with US 
commercial banks times the reserve ratio kept by US commercial 
banks. A deposition of the reserves with the Fed would instead 
have led to a fall in US commercial bank reserves equal to the 
European gain of foreign-exchange reserves. Swoboda (1978, p. 635) 
therefore concludes: "When Europe's central bank holds its re­
serves in U.S. Treasury Bills, a European payments surplus exerts 
no contractionary effect on the U.S. money supply. The money 
initially lost by the United States is put back into circulation 
when Europe buys U.S. Treasury Bills. Europe, in effect, performs 
open-market operations in the United States and neutralizes, as it 
were, on the Fed's behalf."
Swoboda's model stylizes the form of exchange-rate management 
in the Bretton Woods system. During the Bretton Woods era, the 
United States exerted 'benign neglect' with respect to its pay­
ments balances and thus to exchange-rate policy. It did not hold 
substantial currency reserves but borrowed foreign currencies
through swap agreements when it chose to intervene for tactical 
3reasons.
More recently, US monetary authorities have accumulated signi­
ficant foreign currency balances and more actively engaged in 
exchange-rate management. However, as US reserves are held partly 
by the Treasury and partly by the Federal Reserve, asymmetric 
monetary base effects can develop even with US intervention. When 
the Treasury sells Deutschmarks for dollars the US money supply 
does not change because the Treasury - more precisely, the Ex­
change Stabilization Fund where the Treasury holds its foreign- 
exchange reserves - use the dollars acquired through intervention 
to buy US government securities. Hence, the total stock of debt is 
not reduced - only the part held by the public is. By contrast. 3
3. The swap agreements were basically used by the United States 
to buy back dollars from foreign central banks and by other 
countries to acquire dollars needed for intervention. Dollar 




























































































the Federal Reserve withdraws the dollars acquired through inter­
vention from the US money supply and the domestic effects of US 
intervention are thus not sterilized automatically [Kenen (1988, 
pp. 66 and 107) ] .4
3. Confidence and Convertibility Constraint in an International 
Monetary System
Central bankers expressed that "[the original impetus to di­
versification came from the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
and the floating of exchange rates. This motivated many countries 
to try to maintain the real value of their assets or at least to 
increase the return on them" [Group of Thirty (1982, p. 4); empha­
sis in original]. This motivation has to be seen against the 
background that a reserve-currency country can finance payments 
deficits through the issuance of liabilities denominated in 
domestic currency and that it therefore has an incentive to 
inflate its currency in order to gain seigniorage by trading non- 
indexed nominal liabilities for real resources.5
In order to assure that a reserve-currency country provides a 
stable currency - and thus, a stable nominal anchor for the entire 
system - international monetary system created by agreement laid a 
convertibility constraint on the reserve currency. Under the clas­
sical gold standard each currency had a specific rate in terms of 
gold at which the issuing central bank had to exchange domestic 
banknotes for gold coins. This means that the value of Sterling 
the international currency of the system - was stable as long as 
the production of gold did not exceed the pace of the growing
4. The Bundesbank has tried to compensate short-term monetary- 
base effects caused by the international use of the Deutsch­
mark by flexibly adjusting the amount offered in revolving 
repurchase agreements with commercial banks - so-called 
1Wertpapierpensions-geschaefte' [see von Hagen (1989) for 
details on the Bundesbank's strategy].
5. 'Seigniorage gains' refer to the fact that absorption of a 
reserve-currency country can exceed its domestic production 
by an amount equal to the increase of other countries' hold­




























































































demand for reserves. Under the Bretton Woods system, a gold parity 
was defined only for the US dollar - the new international curren­
cy. The exchange rates of the other currencies were declared in 
terms of the US dollar. This means that under both the gold stan­
dard and the Bretton Woods system the value of foreign-exchange 
holdings was guaranteed as long as the gold convertibility of the 
international currency of the system was credible. The breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods system exposed dollar holders to significant 
devaluation risk because the convertibility of official dollar 
balances into gold was suspended and - with the adoption of wide­
spread floating - exchange rate changes in the system could no 
longer be expected to typically involve depreciations of non­
dollar currencies against the dollar. Hence, the only value- 
guarantee of dollar holders was their reliance on the pursuing of 
sound policies by US authorities - basically a predictable and 
low-inflationary monetary policy. Confidence in real-value stabil­
ity of dollar assets therefore meant confidence in a predictable 
and low-inflationary monetary policy by U.S. authorities. This, 
however, could not be taken for granted.
3.1 Confidence and Reputation
Klein and Leffler (1981) show that the presence of a number of 
distinguishable currencies limits the ability of currency issuers 
to raise their seigniorage revenues by inflationary surprises. 
Their analysis is based on a situation where contracts between 
currency issuers and users are not enforceable by any third party 
and users thus rely solely on the threat to terminate the business 
relationship in order to enforce the contractual promises. Klein 
and Melvin (1982) assume that the building up and loss of reputa­
tion to issue a low-inflationary currency is a time-consuming pro­
cess. This is comparable to a situation where there is no conver­
tibility constraint of the reserve currency into a commodity and 
reserve holders rely on the threat to switch into another reserve 
currency in order to stimulate the reserve-currency country to 
follow sound economic policies. The reserve-currency country can, 




























































































for a certain period of time before reserve holders shift out of 
that currency.
By contrast, in a monopolistic market there is a short-run 
profit incentive to overissue because both the decrease in confi­
dence of the overissued currency and the building up of confidence 
in potential alternatives are time-consuming processes. The con­
siderable unanticipated increase in the dollar supply in the late 
1960s and 1970s can thus - from the point of view of the United 
States - be interpreted as an optimal seigniorage policy in a 
monopolistic market but also as a basic reason for the development 
of the reserve system to a competitive market, i.e. a multi 
reserve-currency system.
Recovering the reputation of a currency issuer instead of 
instantly driving him out of business is important in the case of 
foreign-exchange reserves. The abrupt shift of reserve holdings 
from one currency into another would have enormous repercussions 
on exchange rates. Foreign-exchange holders may therefore respond 
to the loss of reputation of the issuer of a reserve currency by 
only partially moving out of that currency, provided that the cur­
rency issuer credibly precommits himself to a value-stabilizing 
monetary policy.
A currency issuer may recover reputation by credibly precom­
mitting to a value-stabilizing monetary policy. Recent economic 
theory - following Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983a,b) - has made clear that the condition for this is 
time-consistency of the policy rules announced by the currency 
issuer. A policy is time-consistent if it is known by economic 
agents to be optimal with respect to the policymaker's objective 
function for the entire future path of the economy. Since in an 
economy with infinite time horizon, the policymaker always has an 
incentive to surprise inflation, his incentive for raising sei­
gniorage gains by overissuing in the present must be lower than 
his perceived loss of discounted future seigniorage gains. The 
expected costs of surprise inflation to the policymaker depend on 
the ready availability of securities denominated in alternative 




























































































monetary policy caused by turmoils in the domestic capital market 
after shifts out of his currency.
In a rational-expectations model, Calvo (1978) shows that the 
time-consistent solution to the optimal seigniorage problem of 
maximizing the discounted (by the constant rate of return of capi­
tal) sum of the present and future streams of seigniorage is a 
constant rate of growth of currency issuance - equaling a perfect­
ly predictable growth rate. This implies that if the objective of 
the reserve-currency country is to maximize the discounted sum of 
seigniorage at every point in time, no time-consistent optimal so­
lution can be achieved. This is because an optimal solution would 
imply changing rates of the currency supply, i.e. a revision of 
the currency issuer's policy over the course of time. The promise 
of monetary authorities not to overissue is therefore not cred­
ible .
Currency holders may thus adopt a form of control rule by 
which the policymaker loses reputation if the observed inflation 
rate exceeds some critical value. This means that a given infla­
tion rate does not in all cases cause a punishment because curren­
cy holders may attribute part of their value loss to exchange risk 
for which the policymaker is perceived as not responsible. On the 
other hand, a relatively low rate of inflation may lead to punish­
ment if currency holders perceive that this source of depreciation 
was intentionally reinforced by the policymaker via a depreciation 
of the currency in question. In other words, because of the uncon­
trollable element exchange risk, a loss of reputation - and hence, 
a punishment - occurs from time to time and at different rates of 
inflation (see also Barro and Gordon (1983b, p. 119)].
To summarize, if time-consistency of the optimal solution to 
seigniorage policy is to be recovered, constraints on the policy 
variables of the currency issuer have to be introduced. Currency 
issuers know that - in the long run - they can do better than the 
short-sighted solution. By acting consistently over long periods 
they hope to build up a reputation which leads asset holders to 






























































































The objective of the model is to illustrate the stabilizing 
impact of the presence of a number of reserve currencies on the 
real value of official currency reserves. The model is based on 
the view that the fact that reserve holders diversify the currency 
composition of their portfolios represents a new form of converti­
bility constraint on reserve-currency countries, i.e. that it pro­
vides an incentive for these countries to follow low-inflationary 
monetary policies.
As the reserve-currency country has an incentive for running 
an inflationary monetary policy and for thereby reducing the real 
value of non-indexed nominal securities denominated in its curren­
cy, rational asset holders discount potential value losses. If 
foreign-exchange holders perceive that the reserve-currency coun­
try deliberately depreciates their holdings, they either ask for a 
higher return on their assets or switch into another - more stable 
- currency. This means that the reserve-currency country cannot 
run an inflationary monetary policy without cost. It would either 
have to pay higher interest on assets denominated in its currency 
or have to face diversification out of its currency, i.e. incur a 
loss of discounted future seigniorage revenues.
The scenario described would not become true if monetary au­
thorities could credibly precommit themselves to a non-inflation- 
ary policy. The monetary authorities can compensate their lack of 
reputation by effectively delegating monetary policy to a more 
credible monetary authority, i.e. 'tying their hands' by cooperat­
ing with a central bank of higher reputation. This is similar to 
Rogoff's (1985) parable of surrendering one's monetary policy to a 
'conservative' central banker.
The basic ideas of the model draw on the literature following 
Barro and Gordon (1983a,b) and Rogoff (1985). This literature 
focuses on the expectational Phillips curve and looks at welfare 
gains in terms of less inflation in a domestic macroeconomic poli­
cy setting. The authorities' objective function includes output 




























































































low-inflationary monetary policy by appointing a conservative 
central banker. This approach was applied to the European Monetary 
System by Giavazzi and Pagano (1988) who study the advantage an 
inflation-prone country gains by surrendering independence of its 
monetary policy in exchange for the Bundesbank's reputation. In 
this study, a similar approach is taken to analyze the impact of 
diversification of foreign exchange holdings of central banks on 
the monetary policy stance of countries issuing a reserve curren­
cy.
The model focuses on the impact of the presence of more than 
one reserve currency on the monetary policy of a reserve-currency 
country. The reserve-currency country is assumed to have a kind of 
exogenously set lower target level, q, with regard to the share of 
its currency in total official foreign-exchange holdings. The re­
serve-currency country may set this target level according to the 
country's importance in international transactions, i.e. to the 
use of its currency as a vehicle [see also Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1984, p. 13)]. The core of this assumption is similar to 
Posthuma's (1963a,b) suggestion that reserve holders should 
diversify their portfolios according to a specified rule. However, 
while Posthuma proposed applying the rule to portfolios of indi­
vidual countries, the assumption made here regards a target rule 
applied by the reserve-currency country with respect to total 
foreign-exchange holdings. That is, focus is on the stock of 
outstanding assets denominated in the specific reserve currency 
while flows of reserve assets between holders are not taken into 
account. This is because only changes in the stock of holdings 
influence the seigniorage revenues of the reserve-currency 
country.
Starting from a given initial share q(0)=qQ, it is further 
assumed that a decrease of the currency's share below q imposes 
constraints upon the monetary authorities. More specifically, 
after an exogenously determined length of time of T periods, the 
policymaker changes monetary policy so as to set the share of his 
currency in official foreign-exchange holdings at time t, q(t), 
somewhere above his target level q. That is q(T) > q. This change 




























































































credible precommitment to low-inflationary policy, i.e. foreign- 
exchange holders do not expect any real value losses after this 
change.
Deviations of q(t) from q are assumed as determined by a func­
tion of the cumulated inflation differential between the policy­
maker's currency and an alternative reserve currency, where ir(t) 
denotes the inflation differential. Changes in the real exchange 
rate between two reserve currencies may also be a source of 
reserve switching, meaning that deviations of q(t) from q would 
also be a function of the cumulated real depreciation, w(t), of 
the policymaker's currency with respect to an alternative reserve 
currency. Hence, depreciation of outstanding reserve assets denom­
inated in a specific currency due to inflation may be compensated 
by an appreciation of the inflationary currency. On the other 
hand, if an inflationary currency experiences exchange-rate 
depreciation at the same time, diversification might exceed the 
level suggested by the inflation rate alone. The dollar between 
1982-1985 may be an example of the former case while the dollar 
between 1978-1980 may be an example of the latter.
However, as Swoboda (1988, p. 100) notes, under flexible ex­
change rates both nominal and real exchange rates are endogenous 
variables. In addition, as there is no generally accepted exchange 
rate model the impact of inflation on the development of exchange 
rates cannot be fully explained. Consequently, the exchange rate 
cannot be regarded as a control variable of the policymaker and is 
thus considered as exogenous in the model. The consideration that 
a depreciation of reserve holdings due to inflation does not in 
all cases lead to the same extent of diversification is taken into 
account by a scale variable, b, which reflects the extent to which 
real value losses are perceived by currency holders as deliberate­
ly caused by the currency issuer.
A further assumption is that the path of central bank diversi­
fication - and, thus q (t) - is independent of the level of a 
specific central bank's holdings of that currency. In other words, 
a central bank with substantial holdings of a specific currency 




























































































of this currency if the real value of assets denominated in that 
currency depreciates. This assumption appears reasonable as sub­
stantial reserve switching can reinforce exchange-rate variability 
and holders of considerable foreign-exchange balances can there­
fore be assumed to have a 'stability concern', i.e. to refrain 
from substantial switching between reserve currencies. The path of 
q(t) is thus given by
t
(1) q(t) = q0 - b / TT (s) ds
0
with: q(0) = qQ and q(T) > q
The authorities have an incentive for creating surprise infla­
tion (x(t)-ue (t)) so as to raise their seigniorage gains in the
short run. However, the authorities dislike price instability -2captured by a term quadratic in inflation, x (t) - due to the cost 
of anticipated inflation, in particular the potential rise of en­
dogenous relative price uncertainty.
The cost of surprise inflation to the authorities is captured 
by two variables. Since the temptation to overissue, i.e. raising 
present seigniorage gains, is balanced by the perceived loss of 
discounted future seigniorage revenues caused by holders' shifting 
out of the inflationary currency, the discount factor applied by 
the authorities is crucial. This feature is represented by p which 
reflects the authorities' rate of time preferences.
On the other hand, asset holders may ask for a higher interest 
payment at the time they want to renew investment in assets denom­
inated in the inflationary currency so as not to diversify. Two 
main assumptions are added. Domestic interest rates are assumed to 
be linked to interest rates in the international financial market 
through uncovered interest rate parity. In addition, the monetary 
authorities are assumed to put a negative weight on the variabili­
ty v(t) of the path of nominal interest they have to pay on out­
standing assets i(t). The variability of the path of nominal in­
terest payments depends on the deviation of the interest paid on a 




























































































el, w. The target level indicates the interest payment on a secur­
ity with maturity x in the international financial market.
There are good reasons for monetary authorities to worry about 
the variability of nominal interest payments on outstanding as­
sets. For example, in countries which have a substantial amount of 
outstanding liabilities, the variability of interest payment on 
government securities induces considerable fluctuations in govern­
ment expenditure, and these, presumably, are undesirable. In addi­
tion, the variability of nominal interest payment to asset holders 
abroad causes fluctuations in short-term capital exports which may 
reinforce short-term instability of nominal exchange rates. More­
over, changing deviations of the return a country has to pay on 
assets denominated in its currency from the level given in the 
international financial market can cause endogenous uncertainty 
about the country's creditworthiness.
It is further assumed for convenience that assets are issued 
continuously6 and that the nominal interest rate is adjusted 
continuously according to the accumulated inflation differential 
between two alternative reserve currencies in order to compensate 
asset holders for the capital loss incurred at the time they want 
to renew their investment in the inflationary currency. The 
specific maturity of the asset, x, is a parameter of the problem 
because it determines the time structure of the rise in interest 
payments. As in each period only 1/x assets are to be re-invested, 
the level to which a given rise in inflation constitutes a rise in 
seigniorage gains depends inversely on x.
6. Note that the assumption of a continuous stream of asset 
issuing holds strictly true only if the secondary market for 
assets is included. Monetary authorities themselves issue 
assets at discrete time intervals. However, the inclusion of 
discrete time problems would unnecessarily complicate the 
model without changing its basic results [see Giavazzi and 





























































































With T<t , the deviation of the authorities' nominal interest 
payments on outstanding assets from their target level can accord­
ingly be written as
(2) v(t)
T>0
This yields the following expression for the policymaker's 
objective function:
T
V = / e_pt [hq(t) + c(n(t)-ne(t)) - (a/2)TT2(t) - (f/2)v2(t)] dt 
0
hrc,a,f > 0
subject to q ' (t) = -biT(t)
with the boundary conditions q(0)=qQ and q(T)>q 
and V  (t) = T̂r(t)
with the boundary conditions v(0)=vQ and v(T) free.
Note that it is also implicitly assumed that the interest rate 
elasticity of money demand is zero, and that output demand does 
not respond to fluctuations in interest rates. These assumptions 
seem reasonable as the fluctuations of interest payments consid­
ered are short-run phenomena, concentrated around the date of the 
authorities' change in the stance of monetary policy.
The policy-maker's problem is to maximize V. His control vari­
able is the rate of money creation, i.e. the rate of inflation 
u(t); the solution is an optimal rule for ir(t), to be denoted
•ku (t). For this rule to be time-consistent, the policy-maker must 
regard expected inflation ite(t) to be independent of its own ac­
tions, treating it as exogenous in the maximization problem [see 
Barro and Gordon (1983a, pp. 595-596) and Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988, p. 1059)]. This is because under rational expectations, 
equilibrium is reached at ne(t)=u(t) and surprise inflation does 
not raise the policymaker's seigniorage gains. The policymaker's 
temptation for creating surprise inflation is merely a source of 
inefficiency, and precisely this inefficiency is supposed to be
1 L - 






























































































corrected by the 'new' convertibility constraint. Thus, in the 
maximization problem, the term (w(t)-ue (t)) does not change over 
the course of time.
The Hamiltonian is:
H ( it ,q, A , ¥) = hq + c(Tt-ire) - |tt2 -  (f/2)v2 + X<-bir) + ¥(iir)
J i t J  1Accordingly, = c - an - bA + —¥ d IT T
The first order condition yields u(t) = i [c - b\(t) + if]
Then: A'(t) = pA - = pA - h X(T) = 0
A(t) = | (l-e_p(T-t))
and, assuming the interest rate on a security of maturity t - and 
thus w - in international financial markets as equal to zero,
¥'(t) = pf - || = pf + f2v f(T ) = 0
¥(t) = - |^ (l-e~p(T~t)) / v (t)dt 
p 0
= “ ~~ (l-e P(T fc)) (|/ /TT(u)du dt) 
p 0 0
Accordingly, the optimal path of inflation satisfies:
r (t) bh
P
(l-e-p(T-t)j - (l-e P T̂ t )̂ (/ /Ti(u)du dt)]
T p 0 0
t of [0,T ]
This result suggests that optimal inflation increases monoton- 
ically until the date of the policymaker's change in policy 
stance. The reason for the continuous rise of optimal inflation is 
that it is best to concentrate inflation at the end of the inter­




























































































shorter period. The slope of the rise in inflation is steeper the 
smaller the policymaker's discount factor p regarding his per­
ceived loss of future seigniorage revenues. If the policymaker 
does not have to fear shifts out of his currency, e.g. because 
there are no readily available alternatives, he gives in to the 
temptation to overissue. The slope of inflation approaches a 
constant as p-*“ which represents the case in which the currency 
issuer gives less and less weight to the impact of current infla­
tion on the future level of seigniorage gains. The rate of optimal 
inflation is also increasing in t, the maturity of reserve assets, 
since the longer the maturity is, the longer is the period of time 
for which the authorities do not have to compensate asset holders 
for value losses.
On the other hand, the rate of optimal inflation is decreasing 
in T, the length of the time interval before the change in policy 
stance. This is because the longer the policymaker manages to 
postpone the change of policy stance, the longer is the period of 
time for which a given increase in inflation remains embodied in 
the path of diversification.
The role of the other parameters is also in accordance with 
intuition: the rate of inflation is increasing in c (the incentive 
to produce surprise inflation) whereas it is decreasing in h (the 
marginal value of a diversification), in a (the marginal cost of 
price instability), in b (the extent to which foreign-exchange 
holders perceive real value losses as deliberately caused by the 
currency issuer), and in f (the marginal value of the variability 
of nominal interest payments).
To derive the rate of inflation in the case when the reserve- 
currency country does not have an interest in keeping the share of 
its currency in reserve holdings at a certain level, i.e. if the 
convertibility constraint is absent, q(t) is assumed exogenous. 
This gives the constant inflation rate
ii (t) = c/a




























































































* ~ * . _Comparing it (t) and tt (t) shows that the average inflation
rate is smaller when the reserve-currency country is subject to 
the convertibility constraint. This witnesses the effectiveness of 
the discipline imposed by diversification of foreign-exchange 
holdings.
The workings of the 'new' convertibility constraint may be 
examplified by the dramatic change in the US economic policy 
stance in 1978 and 1979. By that time, the overall US inflation 
rate, as measured by the GDP deflator, had risen from a post­
recession low of 6.3 percent in 1976 to 8.8 percent in 1979. The 
comparable rise measured by consumer prices was from 5.8 percent 
to 11.3 percent, the highest rate since 1946. At the same time, 
dollar exchange rates declined between 1976 and 1979 by 16.4 
percent on a trade-weighted basis. Especially once the OPEC 
announced another major hike in crude petroleum prices, fears of 
an uncontrollable inflation spiral or a precipitous decline in the 
dollar, or both, began to spread.
As it had become obvious that the dollar was not a reliable 
stable currency any longer investors attempted to avoid value 
losses by shifting from dollar assets into other currencies or 
gold holdings. US authorities reacted by announcing a far-reaching 
rescue program for the dollar on November 1, 1978. Apart from a 
rise of the discount rate, the program included a $ 30 billion 
package of foreign-currency financed US participation in coordin­
ated intervention in the exchange markets. The new approach taken 
in this respect was the issuing of $ 10 billion foreign currency- 
denominated securities (so-called 'Carter bonds') and the build­
ing-up of substantial foreign-exchange reserves (from 27 to 2,911 
millions SDRs between October and November 1978). The adopted 
measures were, however, only temporarily successful and thus - on 
October 6, 1979 - the Fed raised the discount rate and announced 
that it would focus on the supply of bank reserves rather than 
guide the federal funds rate in order to achieve the targets for 
the various monetary aggregates.
As Fed Chairman Volcker pointed out: "Above all, the new mea­




























































































continuing inflationary process" and "[i]nflation feeds in part 
itself, so part of the job of returning to a more stable and more 
protective economy must be to break the grip of inflationary ex­
pectations" [Federal Reserve Bulletin (1979, pp. 888-889)].
This means that the events in 1978 and 1979 brought about a 
change in the US attitude regarding the reserve role of the dollar 
and the engagement of US authorities in exchange-rate management. 
US authorities adopted a more monetarist monetary policy by con­
trolling bank reserves rather than interest rates. This was per­
ceived by exchange markets as the Fed members' acting as 'hard- 
money guys'. To make the shift in the monetary stance credible, 
the Fed dramatically raised its foreign-exchange reserves at the 
end of 1978 in order to actively engage in coordinated exchange- 
rate management with the other major industrial countries. This 
can be interpreted as the US authorities' attempt to import repu­
tation from other central banks, in particular from the Bundes­
bank, by participating in a close management of the DM-dollar 
exchange rate and adopting a tight monetary policy following the 
path set by the Bundesbank.
4. Conclusions
The foregoing discussion suggests the following conclusions. 
The still dominant role of the US dollar as reserve currency can 
be explained by three aspects. Firstly, the United States still 
has the largest domestic economy in the world, evidenced by a 
comparison of gross domestic products (GDP) of the United States, 
Germany and Japan. According to the 'relative size criterion', the 
US dollar should therefore be the n-th currency in the interna­
tional monetary system. Secondly, the US dollar is the main 
vehicle currency in the world economy and both private economic 
agents and central banks therefore minimize transactions costs by 
holding and using dollars. Thirdly, the US capital market is char­
acterized by a relative advantage in breadth, depth and resiliency 
over German and Japanese markets. This means, for example, that 
the supply of short-term Treasury securities, in which central 




























































































much bigger for dollar-denominated than for DM-denominated assets. 
The risk of dollar investors is therefore relatively low. More­
over, the relatively thin and less resilient German capital market 
has made the Bundesbank reluctant to promote a more extended re­
serve role for the Deutschmark. This position is motivated by a 
perceived loss of control over monetary aggregates caused by sub­
stantial shifts in and out of the Deutschmark.
On the other hand, the Deutschmark seems to have obtained its 
reserve-currency role thanks to the Bundesbank's reputation of 
providing a stable and predictable currency. Such reliability 
motivated central banks to diversify their currency portfolios in 
order to reduce the risk of real value losses. In addition, it led 
US authorities to more actively engage in managing the DM-dollar 
exchange rate, i.e. including an exchange-rate target in their 
objective function in order to credibly precommit OS monetary 
policy by following the low-inflationary path set by the Bundes­
bank. OS authorities thus import the Bundesbank's reputation in 
order to reestablish their own reputation lost through above- 
average inflation between the late-1960s and late 1970s.
It has to be stressed, however, that setting the DM-dollar 
exchange rate as policy objective and import reputation from the 
Bundesbank is only needed when dollar holders incur real value 
losses. The probability of such losses is relatively low in 
periods of a strong dollar - differences in inflation rates 
between reserve currencies would have to overcompensate value 
changes caused by exchange-rate changes - and there is thus no 
immediate incentive for dollar holders to diversify during those 
periods.
Against this background, the substantial move out of the dol­
lar by central banks of industrial countries in 1978 and 1979 - a 
period when the dollar was weak and reserve diversification there­
fore reinforced exchange-rate variability - can be regarded as a 
signal from the major dollar holders to the United States that 
they will not accept any further depreciation of their holdings. 
US authorities responded to this signal by drastically changing 




























































































change by adopting a target with respect to the DM-dollar exchange 
rate and actively engaging in exchange-rate management. At the 
same time, Germany and Japan experienced considerable current- 
account deficits and came to appreciate the reserve role of their 
currencies because they found it advantageous to balance payments 
deficits by issuing liabilities denominated in domestic currency.
On the other hand, the second period of substantial reserve 
diversification by industrial countries - between 1981 and 1986 
took place despite the sharp appreciation of the dollar against 
the other reserve currencies. This may indicate that dollar hold­
ers used substantial amounts of their reserves for interventions 
to influence the dollar exchange rate. However, it may also indi­
cate that dollar holders took advantage of the dollar appreciation 
to change the currency composition of their reserves without risk­
ing an aggravation of exchange-rate variability. The ongoing con­
siderable level of diversification out of dollar into Deutschmark 
and yen holdings despite the fact that the dollar exchange rate 
has been relatively stable since 1986 lends supports to the latter 
proposition.
The basic dualism in the present reserve system between the US 
dollar and the Deutschmark can be interpreted as having reestab­
lished the convertibility constraint on reserve-currency countries 
lost by the removal of gold convertibility of official dollar 
balances. The constraint on US authorities consists in the ready 
availability of the Deutschmark as reserve asset in case of their 
deliberate depreciation of dollar holdings. The constraint on 
German authorities consists in the potential dramatic repercus­
sions on the German capital market. This is because an inflation­
ary policy of the Bundesbank tends to cause considerable shifts 
out of DM-markets.
However, the new convertibility constraint is based on this 
feed-back mechanism and thus on sound economic policies in at 
least one of the two countries. But due to the close integration 
of international capital markets, other currencies would always be 
easily available alternatives should German and US authorities 




























































































inflationary policies. Currency diversification of central banks' 
reserve portfolios can therefore be regarded as a stabilizing 
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